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On argumentative constraints
Forms of argumentation between deliberative frameworks
and powers of political expression
Francis Chateauraynaud
GSPR-EHESS
This paper was published in the Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales / European Rewiew for Social Sciences in
20071. The French reference is : Francis Chateauraynaud, « La contrainte argumentative. Les formes de
l'argumentation entre cadres délibératifs et puissances d'expression politiques », Revue Européenne des Sciences
Sociales, n°136, 2007, pp. 129-148.
1 This text originates from numerous discussions that I have had during the seminar on the “Sociology of
controversies and public debates” (EHESS, Marseille, 2003-2005), and the colloquium on “Transformations of
democracy: deliberative democracy” (University of Aix-en-Provence, May 12-13, 2004). In particular, I would like to
thank Jean-Michel Fourniau and Antoine Vion for their attentive readings of previous versions of this text that,
along with new propositions, extended the one that was published as “Invention argumentative et débat public –
Regard sociologique sur l’origine des bons arguments,” in the Cahiers d’Economie politique in May 2004. I wish to
thank Sara Scharf and Assimakis Tseronis for their help to produce, in 2011, this late but valuable english version of
the article.
The themes of debate and deliberation, and those of controversy and criticism alike, are at the centre of
a number of works today. This interest in the concrete forms of the exercise of democracy is tied to the
proliferation of arenas, founded on more or less routine procedures of deliberation, that enable
multiple debates on debates. These debates become more and more animated as this proliferation is
coupled with an intensifying use of information and communication technologies. “Electronic
democracy” is one of the slogans that has emerged in the last few years, without which one cannot
really appreciate the impact of the use of the Internet on the way debates are organized.2 In this text, I
propose to attack the double question of the political and cognitive meaning of contemporary forms of
debate, while trying to overcome the tension that recurs between two sociologies: on one hand, a
cynical sociology - a qualification that should not be considered pejorative - which considers debates to
be the instantiation of power relations among actors equipped with more or less explicit strategies; on
the other hand, a moral sociology, which discusses, justifies and reconciles decisive mediations from
which the interest and the value of all public deliberation are established. A third way can freely be said
to exist in the form of an actor-network sociology, according to which the debates tend to become
organized more and more as “hybrid forums.”3 While the opening of controversies and forums of
heterogeneous actors really introduces new figures into the space occupied by public speech, the
paradigm of a “network” upon which it rests does not help to clarify the processes at play, and, in fact,
runs the risk of causing multiple confusions. Which logics of networks are being discussed? The
paradigm of a “network” allows for a certain association among tools and processes that do not have
the same constraints or the same things at stake; there are different temporalities, and controversies
appear as operators that test connections at the intersection of power relations and the relations of
legitimacies.4 On the other hand, the aforementioned “world network” had to be reconstructed, with a
spectacular intensification, after the anti-WTO demonstrations of Seattle at the end of 1999, an
opposition, conceived of in an often Manichean way, between the “neoliberals” and “anti-globalization”
protestors. What roles did the debates and controversies play in this critical configuration? Were they
not instruments of measuring the forces and the points of legitimacy, or did they enjoy a relative
autonomy? Seen from the perspective of great causes or great stakes, each discussion or deliberation
2The uploading of documents engaged in the debate and the creation of spaces of expression has, without a doubt,
effects on argumentative processes and the exercise of what legal experts call the principle of contradiction. But
this is not their only consequence, because, in parallel, in the social sciences, traditional inquiries of this material
must go together with forms of “numerical inquiry.” Major changes are happening in the way that controversies
and public debates are accessed, for instance, in witnessing the time devoted to the exploration of innumerable
sites, portals and forums produced by the actors themselves. How can we grasp the contribution of online
resources to different debates, affairs, controversies, causes and other collective mobilizations? How is it possible
to understand the changes without becoming immersed in them? Is it possible to talk about the “critical bubble,”
the way we talk about a “speculative bubble” in the stock market? See D. Cardon and F. Granjon about the
emergence of new forms of online discussion and criticism in “Médias Alternatifs, Militantisme Informationnel et
Mouvement Altermondialisation,” Colloque Enjeux sociopolitiques et Internet – Militantisme, critique sociale et
usages d’Internet, Toronto, October 2003.
3 See M. Callon, P. Lascoumes and Y. Barthe, Agir dans un monde incertain, Paris, Seuil, 2001.
4 I present a model of the transformation of disagreements into disputes, that is, the transformation of shows of
forces into legitimate proofs following the general axiomatic approach that I proposed in “Un cadre d’analyse des
disputes,” F. Chateauraynaud, La Faute professionnelle – Une sociologie des conflits de responsabilité (Paris,
Métailié, 1991, pp. 159-249).
seems local. Conversely, from the interior of deliberative procedures, in which normativity is no longer
affirmed,5 significant actors (governments, political parties, unions, industry representatives,
associations and groups, ... ) are spontaneously treated according to the strategies with which they
exploit the debates.
Another way is possible to somewhat clarify the stakes and to propose a framework of evaluation open
to the plurality of forms of expression or disagreement: that of a pragmatic sociology of
transformations, which allows for the identification of the things that public debate adds, removes,
modifies or consolidates in social processes understood in the long term. In fact, like a figure taking form
against a background, every debate improves as it goes through more and more tests or confrontations.
While a debate is understood on its own, the risk is run of producing categories of description and of
analysis that are too abstract. By understanding the backdrops of “public debate,” “controversy,” or
“social forum” with reference to the series of proofs that preceded them, prolonged them, extended
beyond them or surpassed them, the processes according to which a debate or a controversy is
rendered necessary can be seen precisely in the absence of a compulsory procedure; the interrogation
of the impact or the consequences of the debate about places, tools, representations, over the purely
formal aspects relative to the procedure of deliberation itself can be questioned, and, finally, it is
possible to identify precedents and the things that continue to influence policies and judgments in the
long term.
To deal with the different dimensions of debates, it is helpful to focus on the origins and the fate of the
arguments put forth by the protagonists. In the sociological perspective proposed here, arguments are
treated as the elemental units of signification that allow for comparisons and analyses of complex and
heterogeneous material. It is helpful not to confuse this methodological approach with the political
philosophy developed by Habermas, about which the majority of sociologists in the field are skeptical,
resorting to the good old argument that “it doesn’t work this way in practice, because it is impossible to
isolate an authentically deliberative public space from a world of powers and motives dominated by an
instrumental logic!” In itself, skepticism about the real place of arguments in debates and conflicts in
general is stimulating; it leads us to imagine original forms of inquiry to clarify how set of actors and set
of arguments combine. Sociology generally privileges sets of actors, and the manner in which their
strategies, their interests and their allegiances interact with institutional forms of deliberation – which
function, in turn, according to the current rhetoric, as many resources and constraints for convincing
other actors. From this point of view, institutions are simply tools of compromise that stabilize the
relations among actors, blunt their confrontations, and provide norms of behavior and of judgment, the
legitimacy of which are routinely called into question during new crises.6 According to this approach that
5 See J. Bohman and W. Regd (eds.), Deliberative Democracy – Essays on Reason and Politics. MIT Press, 1997; L.
Blondiaux and Y. Sintomer, “L’impératif deliberative,” Politix 57, 2002, pp. 17-35.
6 There is no room in this paper to discuss the propositions of J. R. Searle in La construction de la réalité sociale
(Paris, Gallimard, 1998), but it is clear that the demonstration of deliberative forms transforms the notion of
institution, at least for the actors, and changes the conditions of reasoning, by putting to rest the question of links
between deliberation and sovereignty. We see a bit later that the question of “foundation” takes essentially three
forms for the protagonists of our analysis: the promise, the contract and the mandate. This aspect of my argument
looks at the sets of actors, if an entity succeeds in convincing, or at least in gaining attention through
some argument, it is because it was able to combine powers and laws and render itself, if not impossible
to ignore, at least “pertinent” to the other protagonists. It seems to follow, then, that moments of the
discussion or of the confrontation of arguments do not form but short sequences in long series of
transformations. As a result, the analysis must bear on the evolution of powers at play, the institutions
of actor-networks, and the enterprises of citizen collectives. In brief, one could conclude that by taking
the sets of arguments as an entrance point in the analysis, there is a high probability of missing the most
essential thing: the power dynamic that the actors build in order to emerge victorious from disputes or
crises. In what follows, I will demonstrate the opposite: it is by taking the sets of arguments as our
entrance point that one has greatest chances of understanding what gives the power of conviction to an
entity or to a network of entities.7 In this article, I will proceed as follows: I will first develop the idea
that protagonists devote a great deal of energy to evaluating the “scope of arguments8”; second, I
propose to diversify the notion of “debate” by constructing/describing the complete space of forms of
arenas in which arguments are wielded, ranging from a simple conversation to a political debate to a
confrontation; third, on the basis of this space of variations, I suggest another model of political
sociology, founded on the sets of transformation in which actors are engaged across three plans or
levels of argumentation.
The process of arguing: a question of scope
Analysis based on arguments does not signify an idealist conception of debate, but corresponds to
taking into account one of the first conditions of existence of democratic entities: it is very difficult to
enter into a debate without an argument or without a position vis-à-vis an argument. The set
expressions, “still subject to debate,” “out of the realm of debate” or “to refuse to debate,” testify to
this common experience of not having an argument to add, or not having been informed or competent
enough to respond to it, or not having an opinion about how the discussion was unfolding, or of not
agreeing to the way in which the turn-taking has been organized. There are many ways to account for
this disengagement or distance: the formula invoked most frequently these days is that of the idea of a
minimum of “concern.” To “engage in debate,” “speak,” “ask questions,” or “judge the arguments at
hand,” there must be concern, a notion that allows for the avoidance of “self-interest.”9 In fact, people
and groups become concerned without necessarily needing to have previously constructed their interest
in a space of calculation. This draws upon an important dimension, often forgotten in the sociology of
owes very much to the discussions that I had with Antoine Vion, and the analysis that Olivier Cayla devoted to the
links between weakness and the foundation of rights. Cf. O Cayla, “Aveu et fondement du droit,” in B. Cassin, O.
Cayla and P.-J. Salazar (ed.), Vérité Réconciliation Réparation, Seuil, Paris, 2004, pp. 80-110.
7 The comparison and computerized analysis of multiple complex files in which the future of groups, instruments
or institutions is at play (e.g. nuclear power, contract workers, the use of GMOs or pesticides, the status of
researchers, etc.) give a central role to the origin and fate of arguments elaborated by the protagonists. See F.
Chateauraynaud, Prospéro. Un technologie littéraire pour les sciences humaines, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2003.
8 F. Chateauraynaud, “Invention argumentative et débat public. . . “, cited above.
9 Inspired by the penetrating analyses of Philipp Pettit of the conditions of validity of theories of rational choice, it
could be said that the interest of actors put on alert. P. Pettit, Penser en société. Essai de métaphysique sociale et
de méthodologie (Paris, PUF, 2004).
actors, that of associated milieux.10 Projects, decisions and conflicts can affect places or put people or
groups into a state of alert about the potential outcomes in their milieux. Actors can also feel concerned
about a debate because of a concern about the process, without necessarily having a predetermined
interest in its outcome.
To get out of the dilemma between internalism (prioritizing the study of arguments) and externalism
(the predominance of sets of actors), one must endeavor to think about the arguments in terms of
scope. Who puts forth an argument, what is it important to and what is its importance? The idea,
inspired by enunciative approaches to language, consists in thinking of argumentation as a discursive
movement that describes, with variable degrees of explanation, its proponent (its enunciator), its object
(its theme), and its extension (its consequences). In other words, to refer back to Ducrot’s thesis, one
would say that an argument puts topoi into place and evokes a certain polyphony: an argument applies,
more or less implicitly, to figures or argumentative levels, and demarcates a position with respect to
other possible positions.11 The argumentative imperative that weighs on the participation in debates can
also be understood as the expression of relatively strong constraints on enunciations, ideas, and
propositions, of which the realization depends upon the acceptance or rejection of their importance.
Because it is easier to be reductive when one starts with the sets of actors than when one starts with
the sets of arguments, it is convenient to invert the natural propensity of a sociologist by describing the
actors no longer à priori, but instead through close linkage with the arguments in which they make up a
group of agents.12
The pragmatic approach teaches us that the significance of an argument depends heavily on the
“context” in which it is enunciated. It depends on it doubly: at once via the type of representation that
an argument encourages, and also via the chances that it stands to be restated, without major
alterations, in arenas relevant to very different logics. The emergence of an argument therefore is the
object of cognitive and political work that seeks to associate three types of constraints over the long
term: the series of frameworks or of contexts in which the argument can be presented; the entities or
objects that it affects, and the type of future work or, more prosaically, of change, that the
argumentation used announces. We will not expand here on the dimension the importance of which we
have already discussed : time is not conceived of as an external variable, but more as a modalisation of
the sense of the arguments themselves.13 An argument always builds a relationship among the past,
present and future, to demonstrate that everything has already been said, done, established – which
evokes the “eternal syllogisms” of tradition - notes the urgency or uncertainty of the present moment,
or announces the future, near or distant, and demarcates degrees of reversibility. In the cases studied
10 See G. Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques. Paris, Aubier, 1989.
11 O. Ducrot, “La Pragmatique et l’étude sémantique de la langue,” in J. Revel and N. Wachtel, Une école pour les
sciences sociales, Paris, Cerf-EHESS, 1996, pp. 339-351.
12 This presupposes as known the theory of systems with agency and the notion of “agent,” which comes from the
structuralist tradition. See L. Tesnière, Eléments de syntaxe structural, Parisk, Kincksiek, 1966.
13 F. Chateauraynaud et D. Torny, Les Sombres précurseurs – Une sociologie pragmatique des alertes et des crises.
Paris, EHESS, 1999. Our argument about temporal modalities, evidently central in the case of alarms, is applied to
the work of R. Duval, Temps et vigilance, Paris, Vrin, 1990.
here, the examples of argumentative reconfiguration of the dimensions of time are numerous: “by
stopping the construction of nuclear plants now, we avoid a buildup of waste and reduce the risk of
accidents.”
Theorists of argumentation are divided on this question, but the openness of argumentative
announcements must be admitted, that is to say, there is an absence of a determined syntactic form
that permits the instant recognition of an argument and that would distinguish it from, for example, a
narrative statement, a figure of speech or an order.14 While arguments could take very different forms,
the high level of reflexivity introduced by controversies, debates or social affairs would nevertheless
bear on prototypical figures.15 The table below (Figure 1) gives several examples of traits that allow for a
work of formalization and can act as a tool for the search of instances of argumentative activity in the
corpora of the cases under study.
14 Cf. S. McEvoy, L’invention défensive, Paris, Métailé, 1995.
15 On the forms of reasoning used by contemporary logic to get out of classic syllogisms, see R. Blanché,
Introduction à la logique contemporaine, Armand Colin, 2004, and F. Nef, La logique du langage naturel, Paris,
Hermès, 1989.
If X, then Y If global warming is unavoidable, current decisions only serve to
artificially prolong civilization in the hope that the elites can flee
into space.
Certainly X, but Y Certainly, contract workers are exploited, but their status is
comfortable.
For X, there must be Y For research to be saved, there must be a more equitable
distribution of public credit.
Since X, Y can no longer be Since European law requires concurrent development, we can no
longer have a monopoly.
X is not incompatible with Y if Z Belief is not incompatible with science so long as one augments
one’s ethics of conviction with an ethic of responsibility.
We think that X entails Y We think that the new EPR reactor entails accumulated risks for
future generations.
In the name of X, there is no
reason for Y
In the name of republican equality, there is no reason why gay
marriage should be banned.
As long as X or Y obtains, P or Q
follows
As long as one privileges competence or the market, one will
obtain better reliability or better flexibility.
Neither X nor Y can justify Z Neither urban development nor the interest of local elites can
justify the cutting down of these trees.
It is too late for X, since Y
occurred; we must choose Z and
not U
It is too late to change direction since 25 countries have entered in
the European Union; we have to choose “social Europe” and not
the market.
Neither X nor Y can justify A’s
thesis, according to which Z
obtains
Neither scientific studies nor economic calculations can justify the
government theory that the highway is in the public interest.
A’s belief, according to which X is
the case, is unfounded
Mr. Dupont’s belief that high voltage power lines cause cancer is
unfounded.
A defends the thesis that Z is not Y Greenpeace defends the thesis that nuclear power is not truly
profitable in the long term.
According to A, there is no
connection between X and Y
According to the Minister of the Interior, there is no connection
between the unemployment figures and delinquency statistics in
France.
A and B disagree about the
interpretation of X
The Social Progressives and the Green Party disagree about the
interpretation of sustainable development.
Figure 1: Examples of traits
Among the decisive elements to take into account in the analysis of arguments, which can direct our
analysis to the sets of actors involved in the arguments, there are, of course, all the forms of statements
of protest and contradictory speech, as shown in the last figures in the table below.
These figures are connected to the dialogical revisiting of opposing arguments or to the
interconnections between the commentaries and the interpretations of the actors. Without entering
here into the methodological works on the forms and the indicators that allow for the recognition of the
presence of significant instances of argumentative activity, we can see that it is possible to identify the
elements that give form to arguments, or which permit actors to give meaning to the use of their
arguments. By comparing moments of debate on very different topics, we can recognize six
fundamental elements, the combination of which provides what one could call argumentative
grammars. These grammars, insofar as they make no contribution to the fundamental aspects of
debates, allow for the description of the procedures used by the actors to give an identifiable form to
their arguments: principles, objects (or situations), material forces, logical constraints, traditions, and
opening up to the future. Take, for instance, the combination of these elements in the representation of
the arguments used in the Gaucho case, in which an insecticide was suspected of killing bees, and which
gave rise to multiple warnings and controversies:
You can’t apply the principle of precaution [principle] to the Gaucho case [object] under
pressure from environmental lobbies [force], whose arguments are totally illogical and
contradictory [logic], and make a blank slate of the past [tradition] to render the future
of corn producers even more uncertain [future].
By projecting these fundamental elements in a three-dimensional space, we get a “variation space”
which allows for the localisation of different levels and issues of the debate, understood here from an
epistemological point of view. We can thus distinguish the conflicts of doctrine, which are opposed to
the principles of judgment or evaluation, and separate justifications, which have bearing on traditions or
precedents taken from the past, from forms of reasoning calling on systems of logical inferences,
modalities of expertise and grounding in sensory experience of the world, processes of creation of
objects or of the announcement of change16 (see Figure 2). The advantage of this variation space is to
render compatible the logics that are generally separated into different spheres. This way, the existence
of sets of actors and of the expression of balances of power is taken into account in the set of
arguments. For example, when it is said that “the balance of power is favorable to the adversary” about
some point, it can be treated in a particular proof as a good argument. The argumentative space can be
understood in successive reconfigurations, rather than as static. By describing the transportation of new
elements (e.g. a principle, a case, an experiment, or a precedent), and the progressive crystallization of
new sets of actors and arguments, we can follow more closely the transformations performed by each
public discussion.17
16 F. Chateauraynaud, “Invention argumentative et débat public,” as above.
17 For an example of a long-term view of the successive transformations of spaces of mobilization in health and
medicine, see N. Dodier, Leçons politiques de l’épidémie de sida, Paris, Editions de l’EHESS, 2003.
We also see all kinds of scenarios in which the extremes are formed, on one end of the spectrum, by the
debate or controversy which no longer changes, or changes only slightly at its margins, because of the
institutionalization of slogans or claims (such as in the case of nuclear energy and alternative sources of
power), and, on the other end, by polemics or shows of force which are continually changing, as each
actor introduces heterogeneous elements which make it difficult to determine the exact structure of
sets of arguments and the institution of a common space of reasoning. From this
Figure 2: Argumentation as a space of variations.
point of view, the case of “great national debates,” such as those that took place in France about the
future of education or the performing arts (following the “contract workers” scandal) is a good example:
faced with the heterogeneity of speakers and of forms of argumentation, the authorities were led to
synthesize and authoritatively select the pertinent arguments. The reduction that arose, after the
opening of the space of possible arguments, created multiple frustrations, and the majority of actors
involved felt that nothing decisive came out of it. Between these two limits that make up, on one hand,
the convergence of points of view (consensus) and, on the other hand, the divergence of interests
Opening of
the future
(dissensus),18 we find three configurations of public forms of deliberation that are interesting for a
sociologist. The first is characterized by the creation of formalized instruments which play a role in major
productions of debate, for instance, when new norms are incorporated into legal texts, sets of rules, or
conventions: the debate is here a producer of institutions. The second configuration is marked by a
separation of objects and procedures of debate: for instance, according to the model of commissions in
deliberative assemblies, actors distribute themselves into different committees, and the debate
therefore plays the role of a distributor of competencies. This separation of objects and procedures
allows for the maintenance of the coherence of the group, in contrast to the heterogeneity of problems;
this case is the most frequently encountered when institutions have already emerged. Finally, a third
configuration concerns the emergence of a new form of protest, one that previously did not exist or was
embryonic: the debate here is about the highlights of a political work, which cannot be reduced to the
deliberative dimension. In each such case, changes are well and truly taking place which can neither be
attributed to the actors alone, nor to the arguments alone, but must instead be attributed to the
manner in which the sets of actors and arguments are associated to each other over a long time.
Regardless of whether there are changes in representations, modifications of alliances or oppositions,
the creation or recasting of instruments, the elaboration of rules or norms, the emergence of collectives
or institutions, or of new methods of inquiry or of speaking, the actors and their arguments can be
followed from their emergence through to their insertion into institutions or the expression of common
sense.
From conversation to public demonstrations
On one hand, argumentation can be understood as an arrangement of utterances that engage in the
“grammatical” dimensions, in the Wittgensteinian sense, that I have described above. But, on the other
hand, the same arrangement of utterances does not always result in the same argument; instead, it
varies according to the context in which it is expressed. In this second part of the text, I propose to
consider a plurality of organized frameworks, or social forms, available for exchanges among actors and
arguments, or, more precisely, in which the roles of the actor and argument are enunciated or
announced. Recently, attention has been focused above all on the procedures instituted in public
debate in which deliberation and confrontation of arguments are supposed to be central, to the point
that it is almost possible to put to a real test the model of discussion advocated by Jürgen Habermas.19
But the comprehension of the meaning that actors give to this type of formal procedure presupposes
the comparison with all of the available forms; it is only this comparison that is capable of providing us
18 The idea that the public expression of disagreement can be defended as one of the contributions of public
deliberation. Mark Osiel notably defends the theory of “civic dissensus” against the idea of reconciliation at any
cost with respect to the important trials dealing with “crimes against humanity.” See M. Osiel, Mass Atrocity,
Collective Memory, and the Law, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, N. J., 1997.
19 See A. Bouvier, ”Dimensions axiologique, épistémologie et cognitive de la délibération publique.” Cahiers
d’Economie politique, May 2004.
with the tools to evaluate the nature of cognitive and political contributions of debates organized under
the aegis of the National Commission on Public Debate (CNDP).
The analysis of arguments begins with the framework of enunciation associated with them. A single
utterance may be spoken in a conversation or in a courtroom, in an electoral debate or during a
negotiation, but it does not amount to the exact same argument in each situation.20 In other words, the
notion of argument incorporates and reflects the framework orcontext in which things are stated, and,
more generally, what I have referred to earlier under the notion of scope (“portée” in French). So the
same phrase or the same discourse can be considered to be a good argument in a negotiation, but not in
a public debate. Conversely, different situations of enunciation lead actors to modify, give agency to,
and present their arguments in different ways, because it is part of every argument to be polyphonic,
that is to say, dialogical: depending on the interlocutors, the nature of the audience, and the degree of
symmetry of the exchanges among the protagonists, one is led to say things in a different way while
having the goal of saying essentially the same thing, or to defend the same interests and
representations. The table below (Figure 3) presents a number of very general configurations in which
exchanges of arguments are deployed, and which are obviously not all of equal importance. I propose to
describe each form according to several simple criteria: a dominant constraint for the form to act on the
actors present and for it to hold; a point of reference that surpasses the protagonists, serving them as
arbitrator or justice of the peace; a reason to put an end to the use of the regime ; and a very general
prototype chosen in a list that is no longer expanding because, in the current context, few objects
appear to escape criticism or public discussion.
20 The place of discussion, as defined in the works of John Rawls, opposes “arguing versus bargaining,” without
ever describing changes in context, properly said. Conforming to the opposition active in the Enlightenment, this
analytical distinction has the virtues of grasping the differences between deliberative forms and representative
forms (the latter were supposed to spontaneously lead actors to haggling). But, from our sociological point of view,
scenes of negotiation are evidently populated with arguments, not the least of which is the necessity of
negotiating.
Configuration Dominant Constraint on
Arguments
Point Reference Motif of
Closure
Prototype
Conversation Civility Relation/
Reciprocity
Stop in order
to be able to
restart
Billions of everyday
conversations
Dispute Renounces complete
explanation
Everyday life Risk of
breaking up
Marital dispute
Negotiation Objects are rendered
incommensurable
Agreement
among parties or
mediator
Convergence
of interests
Negotiating a raise
Social Dialogue Extending the negotiation to
the whole social body
State Social peace sustainable
development
Controversy Tangibility of arguments
under discussion
Community of
competent
actors
Tangible proof “Life on Mars”
Scandal Logics of accusation and
defense
Justice Fair judgment Infected blood scandal
Polemic Coherence of rhetorical
processes
Spectator Fatigue Anti-intellectualism
Forum Heterogeneous points of view
and testimony
Organizer Clock European social forum
Public Debate Deliberative norm Citizen Procedure Building a new power
line
National Debate Synthesis and coordination at
the national level
Government Ad hoc
procedure
National debate on
education
Political Debate Representativeness of
spokespersons
Elector/Voter New mandate Citizenry/Laicity
Show of Force Alliances, protests, resistance Power Victory World Trade
Organization
Figure 3: Forms of expression of agreement and disagreement
This second space of variation allows for the understanding of the particular importance of intermediate
levels that make up controversies, scandals, public debates and other forms – to which consensus
conferences can be added as well.21 They play a mediating role between the scenes of everyday life, in
direct contact with practical considerations and places, and the great political causes in which the
asymmetries are the greatest in the economy of speaking and the success of arguments: capacities of
protest, instruments of objectivity, political representations, intellectual positions acquired through the
media, all these resources are alternately engaged, giving rise to a political work marked by a strong
strategic character.
This work in the space of scenes of action and of argumentation permits us to put aside the different
sociological paradigms and avoid reductionism: calculations and battle of wills are not all that there is,
“public space” is not the only level where action takes place, actors’constraints vary according to the
situational and institutional contexts in which they participate. Outside of this space, we can see how an
issue arises in a certain form of deliberation, or, conversely, how a certain form takes hold of an issue,
without reducing one to the other – such as in the recent example of the manner in which the question
of nuclear power was treated in the process of public debate, which until then had been applied
exclusively to issues regarding local development. If we look at the way in which this space is structured
from a cartographic perspective, we can make explicit a number of parameters which make it possible
to model the constraints as they pass from one form into another. These parameters can be formulated
as the symmetry of protagonists and the degree of codification of proof and the indexing of constraints
that bear on the list of mobilizable arguments. We can also go up a notch in formalizing the synthesis of
these constraints in the form of three regimes: ordinary interactive processes, argumentation
dependent on instruments, and the power of expression in an area of political representation.
Three plans emerge from this space of variation (see Figure 4). The first plan refers to the processes
according to which the actors engage in discussion without feeling the need to resort to instituted forms
or to specially mandated instances in order to handle eventual disputes; conversation, dispute and
negotiation can therefore refer to each other without ever leaving the realm of immanence of
arguments weakly dissociated from modalities of anchoring people in their environments. It is possible
to imagine a social world in which people and groups handle almost all their “daily life affairs” using
these three forms.22 Founded upon cycles of reciprocal exchange, the symmetry of protagonists is
fundamental here; the codification cannot be separated from the shared culture and environment; the
objects engaged are subject to a constraint of indexicality that can be said to be “situated,” even when
invisible entities such as spirits, gods, and occult forces occupy the cosmology of the actors.
21 See the very militant but very convincing point of view of Jaques Testart, “L’expérience prometteuse des
conférences de citoyens. Inventeur de nouvelles formes de démocratie participative.” Le Monde diplomatique,
February 2005.
22 We find here what numerous ethnologists have described using the expression “oral tradition.” For example, in
Kabylia, see A. Mahé, Histoire de la Grande Kabylie XIXe-XXe siècles. Anthropologie historique du lien social dans les
communautés villageoises. Saint-Denis, Bouchène, 2001.
Figure 4: The different spheres of argumentation in public arenas.
The second plan allows for a change in the state of the three retained parameters: symmetry is no
longer a synonym of reciprocity, but of equal treatment; the degree of codification is much stronger
when it is removed from the milieux by taking the form of instruments capable of independent self-
regulation, though there is a risk of infinite regression, in that bureaucracies provide innumerable
paradigms, such that there can be rules according to which it is possible to have a meeting to discuss
rules according to which meetings can be called to discuss rules, etc. Finally, actors and objects, and,
hence, arguments, are indexed according to procedural constraints, i.e. categories and argumentative
processes already catalogued. (The legal world gives us the clearest example of this). Immanence does
not dominate, rather, functionality does. The proceduralization of disputes is actually built up against
two other plans: 1. customs, habits and local interests, suspected of a deficit of rationality, and 2.
political constructions and maneuvers that operate in open spaces and create an incertitude built on the
status of rules and their effectiveness.
The third and last plan is that of political space, here meant in a broad sense because the space of
political representation is constantly outflanked on one side by shows of force, and on the other by
polemics – and we see that one of the ”stakes of the battle or struggle”, to use terms from Bourdieusian
sociology that has been widely taken up by the actors themselves, consists precisely in fixing the limits
of what is acceptable, in the interplay between legality and legitimacy that is constantly redefined.
While the actors and their arguments are situated according to this political plan, the parameters
change value: asymmetries are “normal;” codes are in permanent tension or conflict (there is no longer
a procedure of limitation outside of the authority of the state, and the law itself is constantly being
discussed, which is not the case for the intermediate plan;)23 and arguments can be connected to vast
ensembles of actors and objects, potentially engaging the entire planet and sometimes going even
beyond it, as in when they involve the conquest of space. Constraints are no longer procedural because
the arguments engage visions of the world and, more precisely, cannot be qualified as good arguments
if the visions of the world that they convey are judged to be unconventional or deviant – or, since there
is no principle of closure of this point of view, the observer is condemned, in this space, to a form of
relativism. So why are we arguing at this level? One response resides in the idea that argumentative
form allows for the development of a power of expression for which one of the most manifest
embodiments resides in the production of doctrines and of slogans.
There is another way to distinguish these three plans: we can concentrate the force of our analysis on
the three fundamental sources of possibility or on an exchange of arguments, or even on the
implementation of an argumentative constraint. The question to ask then would be the following: What
does, in each plan, spur the actors to argue, even when they have nothing to say, or to exploit available
resources in a purely strategic manner? We could hypothesize that, in the first plan, it is the promise
23 We do not consider here all instances associated with “politics,” but only the moments of debate. While political
debate knows no limit, certain arenas, such as Parliament, allow for constraints in the use of procedures analogical
to those that we find in the intermediate zone of our space of variation. But it suffices to follow a parliamentary
debate at least to be able to say that the overflows are just as frequent as the framing and reframing. More
precisely, the switch to a show of force or a polemic is constant, and this is also one of the major components of
the competence of a political speaker, namely to be able to exploit changes in the regimes of confrontation.
that is, at last resort, at the base of the argumentative act, while in the second plan, it is more a
convention (or a contract), and, in the third plan, it is the mandate (or the political delegation). We will
try to elucidate this intuition a little more. The aforementioned idea about the unification of constraints
is that the argumentative imperative – the necessity of proceeding through arguments – comes from the
character that institutes all discussion, a character that changes nature or importance, according to the
way in which people are engaged: A promise requires/engages one to keep one's word, and even more
importantly, to display good faith It suffices to draw on multiple experiences of conversation, dispute
and negotiation, to see at which point the fact of arguing engages us in a form of loyalty, without which
a break in the exchange, and sometimes resorting to violence, would be inevitable. Would we keep
discussing something with someone who never stopped lying? Would we accept trickery in a
negotiation? Could we close a dispute in a mutual state of bad faith? We see here some of the elements
put forth by Patrick Pharo in his sociology of civil acts,24 or Renaud Dulong referring to testimony.25 The
conventional term, or contract, that brings together the constraints bearing on the origin and the
treatment of arguments in the very different forms of scandal, controversy and public debate, may
appear too general. But we must look precisely beyond the great diversity of concrete forms taken by
debates, which conventionally bind together not only people among themselves, but also objects.
Actors must agree on the sets of obligations and engagements, even, and above all, if they must make
objects or situations speak, deploy or represent: there is an obligation of the means and/or of the result
that regulates which the reality tests actors must undergo, notably when they announce that they are
withholding evidence.26 With respect to mandate, it is doubtless the dimension that was explored the
most intensely in political theory.27 But what interests us here is how representatives endowed with a
power of expression emerge at the end of the long process of discussion and of demonstration. To
produce the effects of enrolment, this power of expression supposes an upstream political work on the
sets of actors and arguments, and must therefore feed the productions coming from different and
distinguishable arenas (that is, scandals, controversies, forums, negotiations, demonstrations or other
shows of force).
In total, the architecture proposed here allows us to consider three levels of constraints that bear on the
protagonists: the production of public proclamations about their experiences in the world of the senses
(constraints of place, for example, the scholarly milieu or the agricultural space); the degree of mastery
of technical instruments and procedural forms, or, if so preferred, instances which produce codes and
formats of action and of judgment (instrumental constraints, for example, the state of knowledge in a
scientific domain or the state of rights in a judicial domain); or their stance (or lack thereof) in an
axiological space engaging values, representations or ideologies (constraints of political representation,
for example, matters of political economy or social protection). But one must be in a position to take
this architecture even further in order to bring together all the aforementioned ingredients to make two
24 P. Pharo, Sociologie de l’esprit – Conceptualisation et vie sociale, Paris, Puf, 1997.
25 R. Dulong, Le témoin oculaire – Les conditions sociales de l’attestation personnelle, Paris, EHESS, 1998.
26 On the processes of proofunderstood in terms of processes of “tangibility,” see F. Chateauraynaud, “L’épreuve
du tangible – Expériences de l’enquête et surgissements de la preuve,” L. Quéré et B. Karsenti (eds), La croyance et
l’enquête. Raisons pratiques, 2004.
27 See B. Manin, Principes du gouvernement représentatif, Paris, Flammarion, 1996.
axes: first, an axis that marks out the degree of politicization of the exchange of arguments, and, second,
an axis that refers to the distribution of internalism and externalism of the arguments. The forms of
argument on the right side of the figure contain structures that direct how the tests unfold and engage
the actors – who must maintain a form of coherence – much more so than those on the left side, where
it is, rather, power and the ability to demonstrate that the protagonists must also take into account,
with the argumentation leading to processes of criticism and revelation for underlying reasons or
interests.
The three parameters set out here, namely, the degree of symmetry among the actors, the degree of
codification of their exchanges, and, finally, the constraints of indexicality that bear on their acts or their
arguments, are well understood as the importance that the debate on debate or the dispute about the
conditions of dispute take in observed situations and processes. This all indicates that the type of
argument depends on discussions about the framing of discussions. If public controversies and debates
constitute instruments central to the process of demonstrating and researching agreement, it is
precisely by virtue of their median position, which permits them to simultaneously constrain the
exchanges of arguments and to assure a symmetry of participants. The three spheres or three plans
made visible by the architecture proposed above can be described as three forms of organization of
argumentative proofs: in conversations or disputes, it is ordinary interpretive processes that dominate;
in the intermediary forms that make up forums, controversies or debates, instruments occupy a
dominant place, which, as mentioned above, give a decisive weight to objects in question, which the
protagonists must take seriously if they wish to convince or arrive at a long-lasting agreement – or, at
least, a sufficient explanation of the sources of disagreement; in the more political space, it is the power
of expression that counts. This last notion is important because it refers to a logic of speech that
assumes a simultaneous asymmetry of positions, the trajectories of possible sets of arguments (stylized
in the expression “global constraints”), and, above all, the conflicting character of codes or of categories
at play (acting and arguing in the absence of a “common world” is precisely what results in the
designation of enemies as a solution). Arguments here are closer to the slogans or doctrines espoused
by those who have access to public speech, or not espoused by those who lack sufficient power of
expression.28 Power of expression takes on different forms according to whether it comes from a protest
and a show of force, a mandate or a political position already taken, or, furthermore, from tools capable
of pooling voices or opinions (e.g. votes or surveys). From this point of view, polemics appear in a
frontier zone because they borrow traits from political debate (speakers intervene), controversy (they
are often justified, if not by science, at least by intellectual authority), and scandal (the logic of the
process is present through the interplay of accusation and defense).
28 The expression “loudmouth” is often employed to characterize people who develop a charismatic type of power
of expression. In the same vein, numerous silences or absences of public speaking rest upon the expectation of a
relative weakness in the power to express material. From this point of view, there is no discontinuity between an
argumentative act and a strategic act, an individual’s capacity and collective force: long apprenticeship in public
speaking engenders particular competencies that allow for the assertion of a power of expression from sets of
actors and arguments. Rhetorical treatises evidently put this argument forth most strongly. See, among others, G.
Declercq, L’art d’argumenter. Structures rhétoriques et littéraires, Éditions universitaires, 1992.
What is interesting about all this is seeking to characterize not just each form of argumentation in itself,
but, (a), the conditions under which each form changes into another (how a conversation leads to a
crisis, a controversy turns into a polemic, and a scandal into a political debate, etc.), and (b), the global
configurations that participating in this or that form of argumentation implies for their protagonists.
Putting limits on powers of expression
The question of powers of expression won by the actors constrains the examination of encounters or
overlaps among three logics generally not associated together: that of the emergence of a public
problem, that of political work and, finally, that of political representation. In ordinary contexts or
situations, such as conversations, disputes, or negotiations, which allow actors to deal with the majority
of their practical problems, the sphere in which powers of expression develop appears distant and easy
to criticize from the point of view of the arbitrariness of the representations deployed in it: “it doesn’t
work like that,” “in real terms,” “in reality,” “in everyday life,” etc. It is in order to succeed in mobilizing
the people that powers of expression must necessarily simplify, cut short, reduce, and distance
themselves from the innumerable details through which people and groups describe their experiences
and formulate their points of view under more ordinary circumstances. Political work consists precisely
in taking into account and making a hierarchy of what, in normal exchanges, could feed into ideas,
programs or claims susceptible to being animated by a power of expression. While the transformation of
“simple” conversations or negotiations into more formalized frameworks, such as the procedures for
public debate or a scandal, implies a transformation of arguments, in that it imposes stronger
constraints of coherence and explanation, the transformation into politics – here understood in the
broad sense of a confrontation of powers of expression – produces a phenomenon of inversion: what
was still under the control of exchanges ruled by procedures changes nature, intensifies, and mingles
with other modalities of action and judgment. Because of this, the innumerable operations of framing
and re-framing in which protagonists get involved to avoid public debate, controversy or a scandal, do
not shade into “politics.” In other words, the forms associated with “deliberative democracy” are not
employed by the actors in order to supplant “representative democracy,” contrary to a trend that is still
circulating among most elected officials. Instead, these forms permit actors to anchor discussions in the
places and tools around which daily life is organized. In other words, forms of deliberation play a
mediating role, a passageway – sometimes open, sometimes closed – between ordinary experiences
and political powers of expression. We understand through these modalities why the form of “national
debate” is by nature ambiguous: it tries to reproduce the function of arenas under the control of actors
by immediately immersing them in spaces subject to powers of expression.29
29 This remark about the form taken in recent years by the “great national debates” borrows the analysis of
debates organized on issues concerning energy, education and seasonal workers. Practical modalities of
production of a national synthesis of debates, generally demanded in record time by the government, make
particularly visible the crushing of ordinary experiences and of the technical competencies of the constraints of
political representation, gathered here under the notion of “power of expression.”
Methodological pluralism and democratic norms
In this text, I tried to clarify the nature of constraints and issues confronted by entities subject to an
argumentative imperative. The result is not a typology of debates, but a space of variation, in which
pertinence is measured according to the degree to which the proposed conceptual framework is
effective at capturing the displacements and the reformulations undergone by the different causes over
time. We see, for example, how the GMO issue turned, above all in France, into different forms,
switching among strongly framed public debates (such as the consensus conference in 1998), scientific
controversies, judicial scandals, polemics, and shows of force enacted directly on the land (with the
emergence of the collective of “volunteer harvesters.”) But while it is easy to see how this analytical
framework can be applied in empirical sociology, a question still remains: can public debates be
analyzed without adopting a normative position, more or less implicit, that leads to thinking that the
more debate there is, the more a society approaches the democratic ideal? Although this option leads to
support for a quantitative evaluation of the number of debates, of participants, of questions asked, etc.,
it is clear that it is not at all compatible with what was developed in this text. If there is a truly normative
moment in the sociology of debates, should it necessarily be situated in quantity, in the appeal to a
discussion of all sorts of objects and the manipulation of points of view, on to infinity? It is also possible
to have as a regulatory ideal the trajectory of forms, that is, of spaces of constraining variation, in which
actors mobilized by a cause can operate. This option opposes the one that consists in pushing a priori
disengaged people or groups to debate, at any cost. In fact, the normative trend can be situated in
opposition to the tendency to reduce the ensemble of forms of discussion to one figure and one alone,
for example, that of public debate inspired by Habermassian doctrine, or that of the hybrid forum dear
to Michel Callon,30 and to make it into the ultimate referent of all discussions or conflicts that
sociologists are led to analyze.31 It seems important to me to defend a pluralism here that is equally
valid on an axiological and on an epistemological basis as well as on an ontological one, because
pluralism leaves open the modalities of argumentative exchange, rather than looking to impose one and
only one procedural order on the actors, whether it is more inspired by the model of a forum or by the
Judicial Council, for example. We don’t know what form is the best for democratic expression and for
debating ideas! Better: we don’t know what form of discussion can produce the true effects that
intervene in the development of an issue on the sets of actors and arguments.
30 See P. Lascoumes, M. Callon and Y. Barthe, Agir dans un monde incertain, op. cit.
31 This point owes very much to the exchanges with Jean-Michel Fourniau, who concentrates on the procedures
instituted in public debate, embodied in the national commission on public debate (CNDP). We know that the form
and issues of procedures of public debate have continued to transform since the Bouchardeau law of July 12, 1983,
which is about the democratization of public inquiries and the protection of the environment, and since the law of
democracy of proximity which used public participation in the elaboration of large projects in 2004, and also
through the Barnier law of 1995 and the convention of Aarhus (1998). On the origins of the CNDP and the series of
public debates on regional development in France, see J.-M. Fourniau, “Les trois scènes d’une institutionnalisation
controversée de la participation du public aux décisions d’aménagement,” in J.-M. Fourniau, L. Lepage, L. Simard,
M. Gariépy and M. Gaulthier, Le débat public en apprentissage. Regards croisés sur les expériences française et
québécoise. Paris, L’Harmattan, 2005, “Villes et entreprises.”
One of the consequences of this proposition is to prevent a reduction of democracy, of
“democratization” or of the “degree of democracy” to one and only one type of measure. We can enter
into democracy from any angle; the independence of the justice system and its own autonomy in
handling lawsuits are as necessary as the possibility of procedures of public debates under
Habermassian constraints (excluding power struggles and rhetorical machinery32); the existence of
spaces of controversies dissociable from forms, such as the polemic – which presupposes a particular
competence among participants, a capacity to argue “technically,” and, therefore, a clear separation of
arguments and “memberships” or “identities” – is as fundamental as the political expression of elected
representatives, or, also, free discussion in millions of ordinary conversations in which people can
explain their points of view, and experience attachments, interests or representations, without being
estranged from their ordinary points of view about the world, the way a totalitarian order would do. In
brief, democracy appears to be the constantly reiterated result of this ensemble of modes of discussion
– which includes the show of force as a limit. The show of force is meant here as collective action that
creates a power relationship: a strike, protest, petition, boycott, etc. – though the list of available
appeals is not unlimited for each historical configuration, because the invention of techniques of protest
is so rare, to the point that it is immediately remarked upon (e.g. spectacular demonstrations of illegal
immigrants or intermittent workers, email petitions, or the uprooting of transgenic plants.) We can
consider the association of the idea of variation with that of democracy as a tautology.33This issue
remains inseparably descriptive and normative: to take up the theme of “democratic minimum,” an
expression that comes from discussions among the adherents of the theses of Habermas, Rawls or
Walzer, we can support the idea that the minimum requirement of democracy resides in the constant
reorganization of forms of debates accessible to the most diverse protagonists. The role of a
pragmatic/pragmatist sociologist is to help clarify and to follow the movements made by the actors and
the arguments, without locking them into a single political order in which their motives are
predetermined.
32 See the importance of “argumentative force” in the procedure of public debate sensu strictu (see Fourniau, op.
cit.)
33 We find here the links that J. Dewey established between democracy and the logic of inquiry through the idea of
the opening of real “social inquiries.” J. Dewey, Le public et ses problèmes, l’Université de Pau/Tours,
Farrago/Paris, L. Scheer, 2003 (1927). See, in particular, the preface by J. Zask, the translator of this edition. On
pluralism and the variations of demand between a moral maximum and minimum, see M. Walzer, Morale
maximale, morale minimale, Paris, Bayard, 2004.
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